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COURT OF APPEALS, 1962 TERM

the lawyer in his role as predictor, e.g., determining against whom to proceed.
Also, the test forces prospective plaintiffs to establish adequacy or inadequacy
of remedy prior to commencing suit, a burden of no little consequence. A further
problem can be conceived where a plaintiff proceeds against the manufacturerassembler alone, and it subsequently develops that the remedy is not adequate,
e.g., by reason of intervening bankruptcy of the manufacturer-assembler. How
is this plaintiff to proceed against the component part manufacturer if the
statute of limitations has run? Further will be the results of causing plaintiffs
to possibly undergo the time and expense of several suits should inadequacy of
remedy rear its head late in the proceeding against the manufacturer-assembler.
A complete prediction of the adverse effects of the adequacy of remedy test
would approach the impossible.
The test of adequacy of remedy detracts from the major holding of the
case. It places burdens upon the action against a manufacturer for strict liability
that will only impair the beneficial aspects of the remedy, in cases where component part manufacturers are involved. Judicial elaboration of the test could
conceivably develop a monster of the law. The only solution is to abolish the
test. Otherwise the evil of privity will have been replaced by an evil of undetermined nature and scope.
Goldberg represents a tremendously significant step in the development of
New York tort law. The rule is clear: strict liability to all intended users despite
privity of contract between such users and the manufacturer. But, the problems
that will arise from the tenuous test of adequacy of remedy are many. The
test serves no apparent purpose, and its main effects will be devastatingly detrimental to the rule of strict liability in products cases involving manufacturers
of component parts. Unless the Court can come forward with both a convincing
rationale for the failure to extend strict liability to a component part manufacturer where the remedy against the manufacturer-assembler is adequate, and
define workable standards for the test of adequate remedy, this limitation
should be overruled at the first opportunity.
Thomas C. Mack
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW

Plaintiff, a construction inspector for the New York City Transit Authority,
sued to recover for a personal injury allegedly resulting from the negligent
maintenance of a trench dug by defendant. While inspecting a subway construction site, plaintiff suffered a broken leg when the side of an unsupported
trench collapsed as he stepped across it. A contract between the defendant
and the Authority provided that defendant shore up the sides of excavations,
provide "necessary or convenient" facilities for personnel, and be responsible
for work connected injuries. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed on the law
and the facts, and the complaint dismissed by the Appellate Division, which
found that there was no actionable negligence on defendant's part and addition277
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ally that plaintiff assumed the risk and was contributorily negligent as a matter
of law.' On appeal, held, judgment affirmed, one judge dissenting. Plaintiff had
not made out a prima facie case of defendant's negligence and, even if defendant
were negligent, the same evidence would establish plaintiff's negligence. Nucci v.
Warshaw Constr. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 16, 186 N.E.2d 401, 234 N.Y.S.2d 196
(1962).

The cause of action was founded on negligence and therefore the requisites
for establishing a case of actionable negligence are focal points of the analysis.
The majority uses the common law standard of reasonable care, i.e., "the risk
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed."12 A contractual
duty that is not clearly specified with respect to the plaintiff, in the instrument
itself, is a matter for interpretation by the court.a If a duty is found to exist
and the facts indicate defendant's violation, the plaintiff must prove such violation is the proximate cause of his injury. An indispensable element of plaintiff's
case in New York is proof that he has not been contributorily negligent.4 The
issue of contributory negligence is usually a fact question. Plaintiff's recovery
may also be barred if the defense of assumption of risk can be successfully
employed. 5 The distinction between assumption of risk and contributory negligence is that in the former, without negligence on the part of the defendant,
the plaintiff voluntarily, knowingly and even reasonably embarks upon a risk
with foresight of the consequences; 6 in the latter, the plaintiff, in a condition
created by defendant's negligence, acts carelessly, inadvertently or unreasonably, and such act severs the causal link between the defendant's negligence
7
and the plaintiff's injury.
Contributory negligence has been found as a matter of law where a plaintiff could perceive the danger and unreasonably elected to encounter the risk
although an alternative course was available; 8 where a plaintiff actively con1. Nucci v. Warshaw Constr. Corp., 13 A.D.2d 699, 214 N.Y.S.2d 91 (2d Dep't 1961)
(memorandum decision).
2. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928);
accord, Carte v. Saks Fifth Ave., 277 App. Div. 606, 609-10, 101 N.Y.S.2d 761, 764-65
(1st Dep't 1951), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 832, 104 N.E.2d 375 (1952); James, Scope of Duty in

Negligence Cases, 47 Northwestern U.L. Rev. 778 (1953); 2 Harper & James, Law of
Torts, 928-36 (1956).

3. See Rosenbaum v. Branster Realty Corp., 276 App. Div. 167, 93 N.Y.S.2d 209
(1st Dep't 1949); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Turner Constr. Co. 2 N.Y.2d 456, 141 N.E,2d

590, 161 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1957).
4. Burdick v. Worrall, 4 Barb. 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848); Spencer v. Utica &
Schenectady R.R., 5 Barb. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849); Lee v. Troy Citizens' Gas-Light
Co., 98 N.Y. 115 (1885).
5. Restatement, Torts § 893 (1939).
6. McEvoy v. City of New York, 266 App. Div. 445, 42 N.Y.S.2d 746 (2d Dep't
1943); McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391 (1928) (dictum)
(Cardozo, C.J.).
7. James, Contributory Negligence, 62 Yale L.J. 691 (1953); Malone, The Formative
Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 I1. L. Rev. 151 (1946).
8. Shields v. Van Kelton Amusement Corp., 228 N.Y. 396, 127 N.E. 261 (1920);
Monacelli v. State of New York, 295 N.Y. 332, 67 N.E.2d, 569 (1946).
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9
tributed to the creation of the dangerous condition and where a plaintiff failed
to observe standard precautions in working with a potentially dangerous object. 10 However, the negligence of a plaintiff has been held to be an issue
properly submissible to a jury where a plaintiff realized the 'passageway supplied by defendant in a construction area was defective, yet chose to utilize
it rather than abandon his work" and where a plaintiff's choice 2of conduct
was clearly unreasonable only from the vantage point of hindsight.'
In arriving at its decision to dismiss the complaint, the Court found that
the defendant owed the plaintiff no contractual duty and that any common
law duty with which it could be charged was not violated.' 3 Furthermore, if
duty and violation could have been found from the facts, the plaintiff's negligence deprived his complaint of merit.' 4 The opinion of the Court of Appeals
is in terms of the plaintiff's negligence as a bar, whereas the Appellate Division
also cites assumption of risk.' 5 The holding of contributory negligence as a
matter of law may have been predicated on a finding of that slight degree of
negligence which bars a plaintiff in New York, or on an evaluation of the
inspector's behavior as unreasonable. Notwithstanding the facts considered in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, that the trench was three to four feet
in width and depth, as opposed to the defendant's testimony of dimensions
of two to three feet, the majority rejected plaintiff's contention that he was
not negligent. The plaintiff had argued that (a) having crossed the ditch
safely before, he was reasonable in expecting to cross without accident on this
occasion and (b) he had no reasonable, alternative route. The reasonableness
of the plaintiff's behavior and the defendant's possible violations of contractual
6
or common law duties were, in the dissent's view, issues for the jury.'
Analysis of the majority and dissenting opinions of the Court seems to
indicate that the theory of contributory negligence does not adequately support
the holding. If there were no actionable negligence on the defendant's part,
then the plaintiff should not have failed on the ground of contributory negligence, for he would not have been under a special duty of care to undertake
extraordinary precautions for his own safety.' 7 But assumption of risk, although apparently not pleaded by the defendant, would have been a possible
basis for the holding if defendant had no duty to this plaintiff and if the

Townes v. Park Motor Sales, 7 A.D.2d 109, 180 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1st Dep't 1958);
(memorandum decision).
10. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Amsterdam Color Works Inc., 284 App. Div. 376, 131
N.Y.S.2d 782 (1st Dep't 1954), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 816, 125 N.E.2d 871 (1955).
11. Kaplan v. 48th Ave. Corp., 267 App. Div. 272, 45 N.Y.S.2d 510 (2d Dep't 1943);
accord: Grant v. United States, 271 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1959).
12. Cf. Zurich Gen'l Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Childs Co., 253 N.Y. 324, 171 N.E.
391 (1930) (Cardozo, C.J.).
13. Instant case at 18-19, 186 N.E.2d at 402-03, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 198-99.
W
14. Ibid.
15. Nucd v. Warshaw Constr. Corp., 13 A.D.2d 699, 214 N.Y.S.2d 91 (2d Dep't 1961).
16. Instant case at 23-24, 186 N.E.2d at 405-06, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 202-03.
17. McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391 (1928) (dictum);
see Restatement, Torts § 893, comment d (1939).
9.

aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 767, 163 N.E.2d 142, 194 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1959)
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plaintiff accepted a risk whose consequences a reasonable man would have
perceived.' 8 Some of the facts, however, cast doubt on the inspector's foresight of the danger in crossing the trench; he had uneventfully crossed it before, and his companion had immediately and safely preceded him over the
same trench. Finally, if one concedes, as the majority additionally stated, that
there may have been duty and violation on the defendant's part, should their
legal effect have been eliminated by the conduct of the plaintiff in this case?
Was the "carelessness" of the inspector of the degree found in other cases of
contributory negligence as a matter of law, 19 or was it more analogous to the
conduct in worker accident cases left to determination of a jury? 20 The decision may suggest a policy determination that the Court will henceforth hold
a specific class of plaintiffs who function daily in an area of many potential
dangers, such as a construction site, to a higher order of watchfulness for
their own safety than would be demanded of ordinary laymen.
(Mrs.) Josephine F. King
LIABILITY FOR DISABILITY FROM OCcUPATIONAL DISEASE COMMENCES WITH
MEDICAL TREATMENT EVEN WHEN THERE Is No Loss OF EARNINGS
In January the claimant, a lathe operator whose work included the
machining of both plastic and steel components, noticed a sore developing
under his right arm. About a week later a rash erupted on the top of both
hands, which subsequently spread to his face, neck and legs. On February 23,
he received his first medical treatment therefor, but continued working until
October. Medical testimony established that the rash was due to contact with
plastic resin at his work. The Workman's Compensation Board, confirming its
referee, fixed the date of disablement as February 23, with the result that
claimant would receive payment for his medical expenses from that date. The
Appellate Division reversed the Compensation Board so far as it bad required
payment to claimant of medical expenses incurred prior to the time of any
wage loss.' On appeal, held, award reinstated. The board may fix as the date
of "disablement" in an occupational disease case the time of physical impairment or need of medical care prior to any loss of wages. Ryciak v. Eastern
PrecisionResistor, 12 N.Y.2d 29, 186 N.E.2d 408, 234 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1962).
Forty-seven states now include "occupational diseases" within their workmen's compensation statutes.2 Some states have included a definition of the
18.

(1930).

Zurich Gen'l Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Childs Co., 253 N.Y. 324, 171 N.E. 391

19. Townes v. Park Motor Sales, 7 A.D.2d 109, 180 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1st Dep't 1958),
aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 767, 163 NE.2d 142, 194 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1959) (memorandum decision);
Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Amterdam Color Works Inc., 284 App. Div. 376, 131 N.Y.S.2d
782 (1st Dep't 1954), aff'd, S08 N.Y. 816, 125 N.E.2d 871 (1955).
20. Kaplan v. 48th Av6. Corp., 267 App. Div. 272, 45 N.Y.S.2d 510 (2d Dep't 1943)
(cited as authority in Grant v. United States 271 F.2d 651, 655 (2d Cir. 1959)).
1. 15 A.D. 2d 609, 222 N.Y.S.2d 376 (3d Dep't 1961).
2. Alabama, Mississippi and Wyoming do not.
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